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Abstract
Studies of NASA mishaps often reveal a flawed
decision-making process – one that underestimates
risk. In this paper we turn our attention from the risk
itself to uncertainty about the risk. In particular, we
look at how decision-making accounts for uncertainties
about a risk’s likelihood of occurring and the
consequence if it does occur. We propose a simple way
of classifying risks according to these uncertainties.
Then we use this classification scheme to gain insight
into the flawed decision-making that contributed to the
Challenger disaster and other NASA mishaps as well.
We show how our risk classification scheme can
improve decision-making and help avoid mishaps in
the future.

1. Introduction
In our study of NASA mishaps, we found a
recurring pattern of flawed decision-making [1].
Decision-makers often mis-estimated one or more risks
to the mission. There were many reasons for this error,
including overconfidence, cognitive bias, and
groupthink [1]. The results were poor quality decisions
that, in some cases, led to the loss of missions and even
human life [1], [2], [3].
In this paper, we turn our attention from how
decision-makers mis-estimate risk to how they fail to
account for uncertainty in risk parameters.
Traditionally, risk is defined as:
Risk = (Likelihood of Occurrence) x (Consequence)
Where Likelihood is typically expressed as a
probability (i.e., a number between 0 and 1), and
Consequence is the magnitude of the loss experienced
if the risk is realized (often expressed as a dollar
amount) [4].
In this paper, we examine the case where decisionmakers estimate the Likelihood and Consequence, but
don’t take into account the uncertainties embodied in
these estimates. We show that incorrectly handling the
uncertainties can lead to poor quality decisions. We
take examples from the domain of earth and space
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exploration to show how this has contributed to mission
failure.
We then propose a mitigation for this problem: a
simple scheme for classifying risks that gives decisionmakers a way to think about and incorporate important
information about risk uncertainties into their
decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
will describe the motivation for our study and why we
chose to examine data from NASA mishaps. In Section
3, we look briefly at related work and approaches taken
in the past. In Section 4, we examine the fateful
decision to launch the Challenger Space Shuttle in
detail, as an example of decision-makers not
accounting for Likelihood uncertainties. We then
briefly survey other NASA mishaps where similar
mishandling of risk uncertainties may have contributed
to mission failure. In Section 5, we propose a simple
model for classifying risks according to the
uncertainties in Likelihood and Consequence. In
Section 6, we show how to use this model in the
decision-making process. In Section 7, we show how
this approach could have been applied in our
Challenger example. In Section 8, we briefly examine
how our model could be applied to other NASA
mishaps. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude with a
summary of the research contribution, the limitations of
our study, and the potential for future work.

2. Background and Context
Our examination of decision-making, risk, and
uncertainty is motivated by trying to improve the odds
of success for earth and space missions. In NASA
tradition, this is often accomplished by analyzing past
failures and deriving lessons learned [5].
This particular study started from our personal
observations of how risks are handled in the
development of earth and space science missions. As
mentioned earlier, we noticed that risks are often
incorporated into decision-making, but uncertainties
about those risks are often not considered.
The reason is that risk is often seen as falling in one
of two categories: 1) as “known” risks, where there is
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no need to account for uncertainty or 2) as “unknown”
risks, where there is no ability to account for the
uncertainty. In both cases, the uncertainty is not
directly used in the decision calculation itself.
We have experienced review meetings where risks
were identified, discussed, and assessed – after which,
the reviewers credited themselves for doing riskinformed decision making – and adjourned.
We have also witnessed what happens when
decision-makers disagree on risk assessment.
Sometimes this led to an arbitrary decision (e.g.,
“splitting the difference” between the two opinions for
the sake of concession). On other occasions, it led to
ignoring the risk in the decision altogether, because it
was “unknowable”.
We questioned whether these decision practices took
place on NASA missions that experienced mishaps,
whether these practices contributed to the mishaps, and
if so, what could be done about it. We sought the
answers in focused study of NASA mishap reports and
detailed studies, as are available for the largest failures,
such as Challenger and Columbia [6], [7].

3. Related work
There is an extensive literature on risk and
uncertainty in decision making. Of interest for this
study are those that discuss schemes for classifying
uncertainty that can be used in decision making. For
example, one scheme of classifying uncertainty comes
from the economist Frank Knight, who distinguished
between uncertainty for which a probability distribution
is known and that for which one is unknown or
unmeasurable (“Knightian Uncertainty”) [8].
Another, albeit informal, scheme for classifying
uncertainty involves what we know and “what we
know we know” (e.g., things we know we know, things
we know we don’t know, things we don’t know we
don’t know) [9]. Oddly, we have found many
discussions of this four-quadrant scheme, though the
approach is more philosophical than for practical use in
decision-making [10]. Our classification scheme,
described below in Section 5, bears a surface
resemblance to this typology, but it is designed
specifically for use in decision analysis.
Since we are using examples from the domain of
NASA missions, it is important to understand NASA’s
standards for risk and decision making. Two key
documents are the Agency Risk Management
Procedural Requirements [11] and the NASA Risk
Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Handbook [12],
which offers more detailed guidance. The RIDM
handbook reminds decision makers that “decisions are
made taking into account applicable risks and
uncertainties” and that “complete assessment of [risk]

likelihood also calls for characterization of its
uncertainty” [12]. This is sound advice, and the
sections below will provide additional details on
motivation (through mishap analysis) and method
(through a proposed model of risk uncertainty).
In addition, this study makes use of NASA mishap
reports [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. It
also draws on some of the larger, independent studies
of the tragic Challenger and Columbia shuttle accidents
[2], [3], [21], [22]. Decisions that contribute to mishaps
are sometimes well-described, sometimes inferred in
the smaller reports, whereas decision-making is an
important theme in the major works on the shuttle
disasters. This is especially true for the Challenger
launch decision [2]

4. The Challenger Example
At the heart of the Challenger launch decision was
uncertainty about the risk that O-rings – rubber seals on
the Challenger’s fuel tank – would fail catastrophically.
The O-rings in the booster rockets on the space shuttle
were designed to expand when heated, in order to seal
different chambers of the rocket, so that the solid rocket
fuel would not be ignited prematurely. According to
engineering specifications, the O-rings must expand by
some amount, say at least 5%, to ensure a safe launch.
When an O-ring does not expand by at least this
amount there is a risk of a “blowout” failure where fuel
leaks out and may ignite outside the booster shell and
very likely to cascade into an explosion. This was
estimated to occur 1 out of 1000 times if the expansion
is less than 5% [23].
O-ring degradation during flight was a known risk.
What was unknown was the relationship between
temperature and O-ring degradation. The scatterplot,
below, shows data on the number of O-rings that failed
to expand more than 5% (an “incident”) and the
temperature at launch [23].

Figure 1 – O-Ring failures vs. temperature
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There were only 24 data points, and none that
extended to the temperature on the launch-pad on the
morning of the launch. Therefore, the decision makers
had to extrapolate the results for an as-yet untested
temperature. They used the linear regression curve
shown as the diagonal line in Figure 1. The following
analysis is only loosely based on the account of what
transpired. We describe a variation on the analysis
performed to better illustrate the risk-classification
issues
involved.
However,
the
resulting
misclassification of risk would be the same if we
followed the analysis actually performed.
According to the linear regression model, there is a
highly significant negative linear relationship between
temperature and number of incidents (p-value less than
0.001). At the time of the launch decision the ambient
temperature was 9 degrees Fahrenheit, giving a 95%
prediction interval of between 4 and 18 O-ring
incidents– would be expected. From a safety
perspective, they might have even used a 99.99999%
confidence level and calculated a extremely confident
worst case of 38 O-ring incidents [24].
This leads to an “extremely confident worst case”
failure probability of:
P = one blowout per 38 incidents = 0.03634
This is less than 4%, which given their 5%
threshold, placed them within their margin of safety.
Under this analysis, the decision to launch the
Challenger is justified.
However, their analysis does not fully account for
the uncertainty about the relationship between O-ring
incidents and low temperatures, for which
measurements weren’t available. To obtain the number
of incidents at the low temperatures, they relied on
linear regression. The uncertainty not accounted for is
the uncertainty in linear extrapolation to a temperature
well outside the range supported by the data.
In fact, we easily see that a linear model is not
appropriate: a normal Q-Q plot of residuals (a plot of
the differences between the observed and predicted
values) should not produce a high, outlier value (e.g.,
greater than 3 std errs). Figure 2 shows the Q-Q plot for
this linear regression:

Figure 2 – Use the linear model?
The point with 11 incidents at 53 degrees is clearly a
major outlier (more than 3 std errs) in the linear model.
In addition, the plot is non-linear indicating that the
Normality assumption for linear regression is dubious,
further rendering uncertainty about the validity of the
extrapolated prediction interval. It turns out that a
power-law model of the following form would have
been a better fit and a more justifiable worst case
extrapolation:
N = aT^b
Where N is the number of O-ring incidents and a
and b are constants determined by the best fit to the
data. Under this model, temperature was also highly
significant (p-value about 0.001) and no residual
outliers. We calculated N=113 expected incidents at 29
degrees giving a probability of a blowout of 0.1061, or
about 11% -- well over the safety margin! This does not
account for the variability, especially from
extrapolation. Considering the 95% prediction interval
here would give a worst-case of 1689 incidents with a
.82 probability of a blow out! In this characterization of
the uncertainty in extrapolation the decision would
decidedly be not to launch. The point to consider here
is, given the uncertainty in how to appropriately
extrapolate to a temperature not supported by the data,
why did they settle on the clearly more optimistic
assessment of blowout risk? Feynman in the Challenger
disaster result suggested it was a case of acclimation
bias [22]. By better understanding the source of
uncertainty and how it affects decision making, such
biases perhaps could be reduced.
It’s interesting to ask how low the temperature could
go for the result to be within the 5% safety margin.
Figure 3 is a plot of the predicted number of blowouts
(y-axis) at each temperature (x-axis). The solid black
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curve shows the most likely number and the upper red
curve shows the maximum number within a 95%
confidence interval. For reference, the lower red curve
shows where the 95% confidence range fell in the
linear model actually used by the decision makers. The
5% safety margin is indicated by the dotted line:

disaster. They found NASA’s decision-making
processes among the contributing factors to the
accident [6]. In retrospect, there was plenty of
understanding and discussion of the uncertainties
present and the risk they presented.
The question for us is how to model such risk
uncertainties, to bring them out of the shadows so to
speak, to make them part of the decision-making
process, as should have been done with the
uncertainties surrounding the O-ring risk on the
Challenger.

5. Modeling Risk Uncertainties

Figure 3 – Blowouts vs. temperature
Figure 3 shows that the number of predicted
blowouts crosses the safety-margin at about 35 degrees,
and the curve representing 95% confidence crosses at
about 49 degrees. The difference from the linear model
is striking. At the actual temperature of 29 degrees, the
decision using the power model would be “don’t
launch!”
As mentioned previously this discussion is not an
account of the analysis performed. Apparently, they did
use a simple linear model, but only using only data
when there was an O-ring incident. Their regression
analysis conclusion was there was is significant
relationship between temperature and increased O-ring
incidents. They extrapolated by assuming there is no
relationship at lower temperatures outside the range of
data for the model and concluding that the simple 1 in a
1000 chance of blowout was the risk and it was
acceptable to launch. But the critical point is not the
different results given by different models. It’s in how
the models were compensating for uncertainty that was
not acknowledged by the decision makers. The models
were used to extrapolate from a small sample of
measurements, to estimate the likelihood of a
catastrophic blowout at the real temperature, which lay
outside the range of their sample.
The decision makers had no O-ring test data to
support the confident expectation of a successful
launch in such cold conditions. Engineers who worked
on the Shuttle delivered a biting analysis: “We're only
qualified to 40° F. No one was even thinking of 18° F.
We were in no man's land.” [24] The Rogers
Commission did an extensive review of the Challenger

Risk has two dimensions: Likelihood and
Consequence. Therefore, the simplest way to account
for risk uncertainty is to determine whether 1) the
risk’s Likelihood is known or unknown and 2) whether
the risk’s Consequence is known or unknown. Since
Likelihood is a probability measure, a known
Likelihood means being able to assign a probability to
it. A known consequence means being able to assign
the magnitude of a loss to it (e.g., assign a dollar value
for its cost).
Thus, we define a classification quadrant of
(known Likelihood, known Consequence), (known
Likelihood, unknown Consequence), (unknown
Likelihood, known Consequence), and (unknown
Likelihood, unknown Consequence), abbreviated as
KK, KU, UK, and UU as shown in Figure 4:

Figure 4 – Risk uncertainty quadrant
To illustrate this, consider how we would classify
the risk of betting on the flip of a coin:
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1.
2.
3.
4.

KK – if the coin is fair and the bet is $1 in
advance
UK – if the coin has an unknown bias and the
bet is $1 in advance
KU – if the coin is fair, but the bet is set by
the opponent while the coin is in mid-flip
UU – if the coin has an unknown bias, and the
bet is set by the opponent while the coin is in
mid-flip

As you can see, this method makes the uncertainty
in risk factors explicit. The main reason for doing this
is to address a second-order risk -- or “decision risk” -that appears when there is uncertainty in the risk
factors. Decision risk relates to how confident we are
that the decision is the correct one. Without taking
decision risk into account, it is almost inevitable that
decision-makers will fall prey to natural biases and
become overconfident in the correctness of the
decision [25].
For example, if we didn’t know there was a bias in
a coin flip we were betting on, we would assume it was
a fair 50-50 bet. In fact, what we are doing is treating
an unknown known (UK) as a known known (KK).
The result is that we are incorrectly assessing our risk:
we are overconfident in a decision made using an
incorrect assumption. We are taking on more risk than
we accounted for, since we are not accounting for
decision risk.
In the next section, we discuss how to use this
model to recognize and incorporate decision risk into
the decision process.

6. Using Classification in the Decision Process
The benefit of our risk classification model is that
the strategy for handling decision risk is different for
each of our four quadrants. If the risk uncertainty is
KK, the expected outcome of the decision is simply
Likelihood x Consequence, a multiplication of two
known quantities. The decision strategy would be the
classic one, in which you can compute the expected
benefit or loss for each decision option. In our coin
flip example, the expected risk exposure for both heads
and tails is $1 x 0.5 (even odds) = $0.50.
In the other three quadrants, we are confronting
uncertainty and hence, decision risk. Classifying risk as
UK, KU, or UU guides you towards assessing the
uncertainty you have in either (or both) Likelihood or
Consequence, and determining how this uncertainty
factors into the decision.
One of the implications of classification is that
decision-makers need to consider their risk posture
before they can analyze the risk. They need to make it
explicit whether they are primarily benefit-seeking or

risk-avoiding. If risk-avoiding, then they need to
determine how uncertainty affects the worst case for
risk. If benefit-seeking, then the decision makers need
to determine how uncertainty affects the best case.
What is the upper bound on the expected loss? What is
the lower bound on the expected gain? Can we
calculate a Value at Risk (VaR) for the decision? That
is, we should be able to assert, “We have a 95%
confidence level that our loss will not exceed this
value.”
Classifying risk as UK, KU, or UU opens up the
possibility of an additional option to consider: the best
choice may be to reduce the uncertainty first, before
making the final decision. Decision-makers often
don’t consider this option. As we’ll show in Section 8,
below, we found this to be a factor in several NASA
mishaps.
Reducing uncertainty typically takes different
forms when dealing with Likelihood (UK/UU) or
Consequence (KU/UU). Likelihood uncertainties are
usually reduced by obtaining more information, for
example, by running more tests or performing more
detailed analysis. Consequence uncertainties may
involve intervening in the system itself, for example
creating redundancy to lower the impact of losing a
critical sub-system. Buying insurance, where possible,
is another strategy for reducing uncertainty in
Consequence.
Let’s look at the KK, UK, and UU strategies for
our example of betting on the flip of a coin. For
unknown Likelihood (UK/UU), we might lower our
bet for a number of rounds while we learn more about
possible bias in the coin, using Bayesian statistics. For
unknown Consequence (KU/UU) we may negotiate
with our opponent to put a limit on the size of the bet –
or pay a third party to “insure” against our losses.
This brings us back to the Challenger launch
decision. How did the decision-makers handle the
uncertainty? How should they have classified the risk?
And what difference could it have made?

7. Challenger Revisited – with the Model
In terms of our risk classification scheme, the
Challenger decision-makers treated the O-ring risk as
though it were KK, known Likelihood and
Consequence.
We agree that the Consequence was known.
Everyone involved with the launch decision knew that
an O-ring blowout would lead to a catastrophic failure.
Burning gases would ignite the fuel tank and cause the
horrific explosion we saw when Challenger launched.
However, we think the O-ring risk should be
classified as UK. The decision-makers were not
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accounting for uncertainty in the Likelihood. As we
discussed in Section 4, they didn’t have test data for
the actual temperature during launch. The data they did
have could be extrapolated using various models that
gave conflicting results (differences in the linear vs.
power-law model discussed above).
Treating the risk as UK might have made a
difference in the decision. Being conscious of the
uncertainty, the engineers may have run their
extrapolation through the more conservative, powerlaw model, which would have made a stronger case for
a no-launch decision.
But more importantly, it might have led the
decision-makers to the strategy for UK risks that we
proposed in Section 5. It would have guided them to
consider the worst-case risk, given the uncertainty, and
then to delay the launch and buy down the uncertainty
with more testing the O-rings at low temperatures.

8. Other Mishap Examples
Challenger is an excellent example of how
misclassifying risk uncertainty can lead to bad
decision-making and mission failure. But it’s important
to verify that this pattern applies to a broader range of
mission mishaps.
In an earlier study, we examined a set of ten
NASA mishaps, taking place from 1986 to 2013 and
ranging in impact from the loss of life down to being
only a “close call” [1]. These are shown in Table 1:
Year
1986
1990
1999
1999
2003
2004
2004
2005
2010
2013

Mishap
Challenger
Hubble
Mars Climate Orbiter
Mars Polar Lander
Columbia
Genesis
Helios
Dart
Compton Telescope
Helmet Water

Mission
Shuttle
Telescope
Orbiter
Lander
Shuttle
Sample Return
Drone
Earth Orbiter
Balloon
Space walk

Loss
Life
Recover
Mission
Mission
Life
Recover
Mission
Mission
Mission
Close

Table 1 – Set of NASA Mishaps (1986-2013)
Reviewing these mishaps, we found that for over
half of them, an uncertainty surrounding an important
risk was mis-classified – and this contributed to the
mishap. For example, the Columbia shuttle mission
handled the risk of its fuel-tank foam insulation falling
off as a known known (KK). They thought the
consequences were known: they knew foam fell off
during testing and even other shuttle flights, without
damaging results. In fact, this risk should have been
classified as known unknown (KU), since the

consequences were uncertain. Foam falling off and
striking the shuttle at high speed ultimately led to its
destruction [7].
We saw a similar pattern in the “Helmet Water”
close call. Mission operations treated the risk of a
leaky tube in the astronaut’s helmet as a known known
(KK), since the tubes were known to leak on occasion
and the consequence had so-far been minimal. In fact,
the risk should have been classified known unknown
(KU). There was uncertainty in the consequence, and
during one space-walk, leaks from the tube caused an
astronaut’s helmet to fill up with water. Fortunately, he
made it safely back to the shuttle – and thus the mishap
was a “close call” [20]
In another example, developers of the Hubble
space telescope mirror seemed only aware of known
known (KK) risks. However, uncertainties about the
quality of the Hubble mirror were actually in the
unknown unknown (UU) category. This would have
suggested the strategy of “buying-down” the
uncertainty through additional quality assurance, which
in turn might have led to the discovery of the missioncrippling Hubble mirror flaw before its launch [13].
A similar classification and change in decision
strategy also seemed to apply to the Mars Climate
Orbiter (MCO). The project knew there was something
amiss with the spacecraft trajectory. Treating it as an
unknown, unknown (UU) risk and buying down the
uncertainty with additional tests might have helped
them find the cause – mixing “miles” and “kilometers”
in their navigation calculations -- prior to the failed
orbit insertion maneuver [14].

9. Conclusion
In this study, we suggested the importance for
decision-makers to properly account for the
uncertainties surrounding risks. We analyzed the
Challenger launch decision as an example, showing
how the decision-makers mis-handled uncertainty in
the Likelihood of an O-ring blowout at low
temperatures, and how this led to a flawed decision to
launch. We showed that a similar pattern could be
found in other NASA mishaps, as well.
We proposed a new risk classification scheme
based on uncertainties about risk Likelihood and
Consequence; and we presented decision strategies for
each of our four risk uncertainty classifications. We
applied our classification scheme and the resulting
decision strategy to the Challenger launch decision and
discussed its application to other NASA mishaps.

8.1. Contribution and Future Work
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The contributions of this research include: a new
framework for classifying risk uncertainties, strategies
for using the classification scheme, and its application
to decision-making under risk and uncertainty. This
research also contributed to a greater understanding of
the decision-making errors that contributed to the
Challenger disaster and other NASA mishaps.
Future work includes a broader application of this
framework to decision-making in other high-risk
domains, for example medicine or public safety.
Another potential application is to risk
management standards and practices. For example, the
NASA Risk Informed Decision Making Handbook
advises mission decision-makers to “take uncertainty
under consideration” – but doesn’t provide a method
for doing so [12]. Using the framework and decision
strategies presented here, risk standards could offer
concrete guidance in this area.
Ultimately, the goal of this and related research
remains one of learning the lessons of past mishaps,
adjusting our standards and practices accordingly, and
steadily improving our odds of mission success.
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